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ABSTRACT: Behavioral targeting is a method used by online
advertisers to collect information on Internet users in order
to better target their advertising toward those users.
Concerns exist in this field regarding the protection and
security of the information collected. Such concerns have
become amplified after recent mergers between companies
with large databases of behavioral information, such as the
Microsoft-aQuantive and Google-DoubleClick mergers of
2007 and 2008. This note serves as an overview of the
issues raised by mergers between companies with databases
of behavioral information, and specifically addresses the
concerns raised by such mergers, the current regulatory
system in place regarding behavioral targeting information,
and proposed methods regarding the future regulation of
behavioral targeting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Behavioral targeting is a practice that online advertising
companies use to place advertisements that consumers are likely to be
receptive towards. While considered an effective and innovative
method of advertising, behavioral advertising primarily targets
consumers by collecting potentially sensitive data on persons via their
website visits and Internet searches.
Privacy groups began expressing concerns about behavioral
targeting around the time of the failed DoubleClick-Abacus merger in
2001, leading to such enforcement as the National Advertising
Initiative's self-policing agreement (the "NAI Agreement"). Currently,
behavioral targeting issues have been revived due to the recent
mergers of Microsoft-aQuantive and particularly Google-DoubleClick
as a result of the large amount of data being merged and concerns
over the current regulatory structure.
This note discusses the privacy concerns raised by these mergers.
First, the article explains behavioral targeting and the privacy
concerns it creates. The article then discusses the DoubleClick-
Abacus, Microsoft-aQuantive, and Google-DoubleClick mergers and
their significance to behavioral targeting. The article then describes
the Federal Trade Commission's new proposed principles regarding
behavioral targeting, as well as the critiques and responses these
principles have generated. The article concludes with a brief
discussion of the Federal Trade Commission's February 2009 revised
principles regarding behavioral targeting.
II. WHAT is BEHAVIORAL TARGETING AND WHY DOES IT POSE
PRIVACY CONCERNS
Behavioral targeting is the process by which advertisers track
Internet users' online activities and place ads based on these
activities.' Typically, the advertisers create behavioral segments to
describe users' online activities, and then, when the user visits other
1 Specific Media, What is Behavioral Targeting?,
http://www.behavioraltargeting.com/what-is-behavioral-targeting.html (last visited Feb.
1, 2009). According to the Federal Trade Commission's proposal for self-regulatory
guidelines, behavioral targeting is "the tracking of a consumer's activities online to target
advertising." FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE
DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES 2 (2007) [hereinafter
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING], http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo7/12/P8599oostmt.pdf.
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sites, the advertisers place ads for products that relate to the
behavioral segment with which the user is identified.2 Information
from Internet users is gathered by tracking the websites they visit, the
keyword searches they conduct, and also by profiling visitors to a
customer's website and then tracking his or her behavior. 3 This
information is then used to identify advertisers' target audiences and
place ads for products based on where a person has gone or what a
person has done online, creating more personally directed
advertisements.4 This information collection and tracking is largely
done via "cookies."
Cookies are small files deposited on the hard drive of a user as the
user navigates the Internet.5 Cookies track what a person is doing
online, and while they can improve a website by making it easier for
the user to navigate or customize the site, cookies can also profile and
track the behavior of a user when they are online. 6 Major online
advertisers use cookies in order to learn of the web-browsing habits of
users, and target those users with advertisements that are potentially
more relevant to a particular consumer. 7
The debate about the lack of privacy in online advertising revolves
around the use of tracking devices such as cookies. The concerns over
the use of cookies stems from the fact that cookies can follow a user
through countless websites and can do so for long periods of time,
potentially decades.8 In order to prevent these information-gathering
practices, some companies that use cookies "abide by a self-regulation
2 Specific Media, supra note 1. Behavioral segments are usually based on activities of a
user online, such as what sites he or she has visited and what keyword searches he or she
has performed.
3 Id.
4 Joshua Koran, Understand the 4 BTMethods, IMEDIA CONNECTION, July 18, 2008,
http://www.imediaconnection.com/content/consumer-strategies-targeting-understand-
the-4-bt-methods-_19935.html; Russell Shaw, Behavioral Targeting lol, IMEDIA
CONNECTION, Apr. 28, 2004, http://www.imediaconnection.com/content/3297.asp.
5 Pam Dixon, Consumer Tips: How to Opt-Out of Cookies That Track You, WORLD PRIVACY
FORUM, Sept. 1, 2004, http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/cookieoptout.html.
6Id.
7 FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 6-8 (June 2000)
[hereinafter FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS],
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/o6/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf.
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scheme that asks [a user] for consent [to use the cookies] in some
cases and offers an opt-out [cookie for] this kind of tracking."9 The
self-regulatory scheme in question was formalized in the NAI
Agreement, which will be discussed in further detail below. 10
Behavioral targeting poses a threat to privacy by allowing
advertisers to use tracking to collect sensitive personal data from
unknowing Internet users. Advertisers, in order to personalize their
advertisements to individual users, need to gather and store
information based on an individual's web activities.1, Storage of
collected personal information has led to the creation of large
databases containing Internet-use information on millions of Internet
users, diminishing the privacy of consumers significantly by
potentially allowing third parties, such as law enforcement agents, to
survey the databases without any legal basis.12
III. THE DOUBLECLICK-ABACUS MERGER AND FTC/NAI AGREEMENT
DoubleClick is one of the largest and most successful online
advertising companies in the world, having amassed a large database
of personal information via behavioral targeting, including data such
as a web surfer's shopping habits and website visits.'3 The amount of
data collected, and its personal nature, has created a high level of
concern from organizations such as the Electronic Privacy
Information Center ("EPIC"), particularly in regard to the security of
the data collected and the unstated uses of the data gathered.14 This
9 Id.
1o The NAI adopted new principles of self-regulation in December of 2008. See Part VII,
infra, for a discussion of these newly adopted principles.
1 FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 5. DoubleClick, in particular, tracks
individuals through the Internet by assigning users a unique number and recording that
number in a cookie on the user's computer. The user is then recorded as visiting other sites
where DoubleClick serves ads, which is stored by DoubleClick for two years. See
Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, In
Re Google and DoubleClick, at 9 (Fed. Trade Comm'n, Apr. 20, 2007),
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic-complaint.pdf.
12 In Re Google and DoubleClick, supra note 11, at 10.
13 Patricia Jacobus, FTC Investigates DoubleClick's Data-Collection Practices, CNET
NEWS, Feb. 16, 2000, http://news.cnet.com/2lOO-1023-237007.html.
14 In Re Google and DoubleClick, supra note 11, at 1-2.
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concern, and concerns in general regarding behavioral targeting
advertisers, is prevalent because of the combination of large amounts
of personally and non-personally identifiable data because of mergers
between companies that each had gathered a significant store of data
on Internet users.15 Critics noted such concern with the DoubleClick-
Abacus merger of 1999.
DoubleClick's merger with Abacus was the first merger to create
extensive privacy concerns. In 1999, DoubleClick and offline market
researcher Abacus gained shareholder approval to merge. 16 The
purported aim of the merger was to allow the combined company to
target potential consumers with greater accuracy by using the
customers' online viewing tendencies to offer advertisements
specifically directed to customers' interests.17 The merger was to
combine DoubleClick's information from its five billion Internet ads
per week with Abacus's two billion personally identifiable consumer
catalog transactions, a merger of two large databases. 18
Privacy groups were opposed to the proposed merger due to the
potential that the combined company would abuse the personal data
gathered by the newly formed company.19 Among these groups were
Junkbusters, EPIC, Privacy International, and the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group.2° The stock market also reacted unfavorably to the
deal; news of the merger agreement caused the value of both
DoubleClick and Abacus stock to decline, with DoubleClick's stock
dropping primarily due to privacy concerns including a formal
investigation opened by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and
inquires by attorneys general concerning DoubleClick's business
15 Id. at 10.
16 Courtney Macavinta, DoubleClick, Abacus Merge in $1.7 Billion Deal, CNET NEWS, Nov.
24, 1999, http://www.news.com/2100-1o23-233526.html.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.; see also Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for
Other Relief, supra note 11, at 1.
2o Computergram Int'l, Privacy Fallout from DoubleClick Merger with Abacus Direct,
CBR ONLINE, June 22, 1999,
http://www.cbronline.com/news/privacyfallout-from_doubleclick-merger-with-abacu
s_direct.
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practices. 21 Additionally, the FTC required DoubleClick to adopt
privacy standards for online advertising and to create an opt-out
cookie that would note users who did not desire to receive advertising
through DoubleClick.22 Although the merger was consummated,
DoubleClick eventually sold Abacus at a financial loss after the FTC
was asked to get involved and force DoubleClick's adoption of privacy
standards. 23 DoubleClick admitted that it made a "mistake by
planning to merge names with anonymous user activity across
websites in the absence of government and industry privacy
standards," a mistake the stock market recognized immediately with
the aforementioned decrease in stock value.24
After the DoubleClick-Abacus fiasco, the FTC entered into an
agreement with several online advertising companies regarding
privacy-supporting practices, adopted by those advertisers as
members of the Network Advertising Initiative.25 The NAI Agreement
addressed behavioral targeting companies' concerns over stringent
regulation fears, and attempted to alleviate concerns about privacy in
mergers between companies with offline data and those with online
information.26 Under the NAI Agreement, companies receive a safe
21 DoubleClick, Abacus Stocks Drop After Merger News, DIREC MAG., June 15, 1999,
http://directmag.com/news/marketing-doubleclick-abacusstocks; Mark Sakalosky,
DoubleClick's Double Edge, CLICKZ, Sept. 3, 2002, http://www.clickz.com/1455141.
22 An Examination of the Google-DoubleClick Merger and the Online Advertising
Industry: What are the Risks for Competition and Privacy? Before the S. Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
11oth Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, President, Electronic Privacy
Information Center), http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic-test-o927o7.pdf.
23 Id.; see also David A. Utter, DoubleClick Dumps Abacus at a Loss, WEBPRoNEwS, Dec.
28, 2006, http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/20o6/12/28/DoubleClick-dumps-
abacus-at-a-loss.
24 An Examination of the Google-DoubleClick Merger and the Online Advertising
Industry, supra note 22; Utter, supra note 23.
25 PAM DIXON, THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE: FAILING AT CONSUMER PROTECrION
AND AT SELF-REGULATION 5 (2007),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPFNAIreportNov2-2007fs.pdf. See also
Network Adver. Initiative, A Track Record of Success,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/about/history.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
26 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal Trade Commission Issues Report on Online
Profiling (July 27, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/onlineprofiling.shtm. The NAI principles agreed to
were as follows: (1) consumers were to be given notice of the profiling activities of network
advertisers along with a choice not to participate; (2) choice, which involved a question of
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harbor against any new federal privacy legislation, provided the
companies keep the FTC informed about their actions, and that they
follow NAI guidelines. 27 This agreement represented the first
regulation of behavioral tracking to reach DoubleClick and their
business practices, as DoubleClick joined and is now currently a
member of the NAI as part of Google.28 Still, proposed legislation
from policymakers and criticisms by consumer advocate groups
indicated that the NAI Agreement was likely just the start of the
regulation of behavioral targeting.29 However, the principles set forth
in the NAI Agreement did provide relief among the advertising
companies that such enforcement was going to be a gradual process.30
IV. THE MICROSOFT-AQUANTIVE MERGER
On May 18, 2007, Microsoft issued a press release stating that it
agreed to acquire aQuantive, an online advertising platform. 31
opt-in and opt-out options for users in regard to the sensitivity of the information that was
being collected; (3) access provided to users regarding information that was or was related
to personally identifiable information; (4) reasonable efforts to keep the data collected
secure by network advertisers; (5) NAI companies would agree to have violations enforced
by a third party enforcement program, with NAI companies submitting to independent
compliance audits with public results if this was not done in six months.
27 Keith Perine, Who Are the Privacy Police?- Government Activity, THE INDUS.
STANDARD, Aug. 14, 2000, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-moHWW/is-3o_3/ai_66678711/pgj. The NAI
was granted the ability to implement safe harbors to self-regulatory principles that
effectively implemented fair information practices articulated within legislation and any
subsequent rules made. The final decision as to whether any self-regulatory guidelines
qualify for safe harbor status would be made by the NAI following any rulemaking, after
the NAI had an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the guidelines at the time the
safe harbor application was made. FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 10-11.
28 Network Adver. Initiative, Opt Out of NAI Member Ad Networks,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/opt-out.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
The former DoubleClick opt-out no longer exists, having been replaced by a Google opt-out
cookie.
29 DIXON, supra note 25, at i; Stefanie Olsen, Ad Firms Benefit from FTC Privacy Decision,
CNET NEWS, July 28, 20o0, http://att.com.com/Ad-firms-benefit-from-FTC-privacy-
decision/21oo-1o23_3-243822.html.
30 Olsen, supra note 29.
31 Press Release, Microsoft Adver. Worldwide, Microsoft to Acquire aQuantive, Inc. (May
18, 2007), available at
http://advertising.microsoft.com/asia/NewsAndEvents/PressRelease.aspx?Adv-PressRel
easeID=537.
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Microsoft completed the acquisition on August 13, 2007; the deal
represented the most expensive acquisition in Microsoft's history,
costing over six billion dollars.32 The aQuantive acquisition was one of
many acquisitions that Microsoft made in its effort to expand its
online advertising reach in response to Google's growing presence in
online advertising.33
Microsoft began aggressively competing against Google in 2003 in
online search and advertising. 34 At the time of the Microsoft-
aQuantive merger, advertisement dollars had been moving online and
Google had become an advertising powerhouse. 35 Indeed, many
speculated that Microsoft paid such a high price for aQuantive
because it was desperate to stay competitive with Google in the online
advertising business.3 6 Microsoft needed a way to allow it to deliver
content and advertising online, and it could do both by acquiring
aQuantive.37 This merger was akin to the Google-DoubleClick merger
described in the next section, and thus implicates similar privacy
concerns regarding database mergers as will be discussed in the
section below.
32 The FTC approved the acquisition on July 6, 2007. Thomas Claburn, FTC Clears
Microsoft's $6 Billion Dealfor aQuantive, INFO. WEEK, July 9, 2007,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=2oogoo868&subSe
ction=AII+Stories; John Fontana, Microsoft Buys aQuantive, Sets Up Online Ad Group, PC
WORLD, Aug. 14, 2007,
http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id,135928/printable.html.
33 Fontana, supra note 32. Microsoft had also purchased AdCEN, which linked buyers and
sellers of ad space, ScreenTonic, which delivered ads to mobile devices based on location,
and Massive, which advertised through online video game services.
34 Joe Wilcox, Why Microsoft Wrote aQuantive a Big Check, MICROSOFT WATCH, May 18,
2007, http://www.microsoft-
watch.com/content/corporate/why-microsoft-wrote-aquantive a-bigcheck.html.
35 Id.
36 Terence Channon, Microsoft's aQuantive Deal: An Act of Desperation, SEEKING ALPHA,
May 21, 2007, http://seekingalpha.com/article/36o9o-microsoft-s-aquantive-deal-an-act-
of-desperation. Privacy concerns were not cited as a major issue in the Microsoft-
aQuantive merger, though this is possibly because larger databases were involved in the
Google-DoubleClick merger.
37 Id.
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V. THE GOOGLE-DOUBLECLICK MERGER
The merger that has provoked the most concern about the privacy
impacts of online behavioral targeting is the Google-DoubleClick
merger, which the companies completed on March 11, 2008 after an
acrimonious public debate.38 In aligning with DoubleClick, Google
stated it could "democratize display and rich-media ads the same way
as it did with search, expanding the number of advertisers in the mix,"
or increasing the number of advertisers in a way to make display and
rich-media ads more open, in turn boosting demand for the
DoubleClick ad serving technology.39 The merger was challenged by
EPIC, the Center for Digital Democracy, and the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group.40 These groups asserted that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right in the United States, and that right may be violated
by the collection and use of personal information because Google and
DoubleClick had yet to safeguard collected personal data adequately.41
Internet search engines are the primary way people access
Internet content. Search terms such as those used in a Google search
can reveal sensitive information on users, including their personal
information and interests. In 2005 alone, over sixty million people
used search engines.42 DoubleClick collects data using "web bugs,"
also known as "clear GIFs," to collect data on Internet users. 43 In
order to prevent web bugs or clear GIFs from collecting this personal
data, a person must download an opt-out cookie to stop data
38 Press Release, Google, Google Closes Acquisition of DoubleClick (Mar. 11, 2oo8),
available at http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/2oo8o31l_doubleclick.html.
39 Stephanie Olsen, Privacy Concerns Dog Google-DoubleClick Deal, CNET NEWS, Apr. 18,
2007, http://news.cnet.com/Privacy-concerns-dog-Google-DoubleClick-deal/21oo-
1024_3-6177029.html.
40 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 11, at 1-2.
41 Id. at 1-3.
42Id. at3.
43 Id. at 4. "Web bugs," "clear GIFs," and "pixel tags" are incredibly tiny electronic tags
featured on web pages, that act similar to beacons in that they send a call-back to a server
stating that a user is on a website, and therefore, act as an alternative method to cookies of
tracking users online. Concerns have been raised due to their nigh-undetectable nature,
rendering most users unable to tell that data is being compiled on them when they are
visiting websites. Stephanie Olsen, Nearly Undetectable Tracking Device Raises Concern,
CNET NEWS, July 12, 2000, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1o17-243o77.html.
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collection. 44 However, most users are unaware of the need to
download opt-out cookies, resulting in DoubleClick likely collecting
data from the majority of Internet users.45
On April 20, 2007, EPIC, along with the other organizations
challenging the Google-DoubleClick merger, filed a complaint (and
subsequently filed two supplemental complaints) with the FTC,
alleging violations of the FTC Act, and the Sherman and Clayton
Antitrust Acts.46 EPIC noted in its initial complaint that the Google-
DoubleClick merger would allow Google to track both Internet search
actions and website visits.47 While Google already tracked search
activity at the time of the proposed merger, it did not use the
information it collected to engage in behavioral targeting.48 Instead,
Google stored search activity in connection with a person's Internet
Protocol ("IP") address indefinitely, meaning Google could use such
information to track search activity in the future.49
According to EPIC, DoubleClick created profiles of persons from
users' web history of viewing sites that contained DoubleClick cookies
and web bugs.5O The information gathered by this technology was
purportedly kept by DoubleClick's clients and DoubleClick had either
44 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 11, at 5.
45 DIXON, supra note 25, at 6.
46 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy? Proposed Google/DoubleClick Deal,
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). In its original complaint,
EPIC challenged the merger under section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2008).
Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 11, at 9-10. In its supplemental complaint, EPIC also challenged the merger
under section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2oo8), as well as under section
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2oO8), which proscribe mergers that lessen
competition and prohibite agreements constituting unreasonable restraints of trade,
respectively. Supplemental Materials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for
Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, In Re Google and DoubleClick,
at 15 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Jun. 20, 2007),
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/supp-o60607.pdf.
47 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 11, at 6.
48 Id. at 7.
49 Id.
5o Id. at 9. "Web bugs" are defined in footnote 42; "cookies" are defined in Section II, infra.
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no or limited access to the data collected. 51 According to the
complaint, DoubleClick gathered information without user awareness;
users could not view the data collected on them, and while opt-out
cookies were available from DoubleClick via the NAI, they still
permitted the collection of "non-personally-identifiable
information." 52 Furthermore, the opt-out cookies had to be
downloaded again if a user purged cookies from his computer.53
EPIC claimed that Google was committing unfair or deceptive
business practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.54 EPIC
argued that Google's privacy policy was not easily accessible to users,
and that Google collected information from users without providing
adequate notice. 5 EPIC noted in their complaint that Google
collected information without complying with Fair Information
Practices or Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") Privacy Guidelines, which was likely to cause
substantial injuries to consumers that would not be reasonably
avoidable by the consumers.56 Such lack of reasonable avoidance was
stated as causing likely substantial injuries through actions such as
51 Supplemental Materials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction,
Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, supra note 46, at 1-2.
52 Id. at 14. The NAI opt-out was formerly located on NAI's website. It is currently listed as
a Google opt-out cookie, as Google and DoubleClick have merged. See Network Adver.
Initiative, Opt Out of NAI Member Ad Networks,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/opt-out.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
53 Supplemental Materials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction,
Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, supra note 46, at 14.
54 Id. at 9. Section 5 of the FTC Act outlaws unfair methods, in or affecting commerce in
competition, and unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(2008). The term "unfair or deceptive practice" itself is not actually defined by the statute,
or in the FTC Act, leaving the possibility that it is a broadly inclusive phrase. See Letter
from Edolphus Towns, Congressman, to Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of the Fed.
Trade Comm'n (Oct. 26, 2007), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/towns-1o26o7.pdf.
55 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 11, at 9.
56 Id. at 9-1o. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Fair Information Practice Principles, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). Org. for
Eco. Co-Operation and Dev., OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
http://www.oeed.org/document/18/o,3343,en-2649-34255-1 8 1518 6 _1_1 00l,oo.html
(last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
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the storing of users' data without notice, and the undermining of the
ability of consumers to avail themselves to privacy protections
promised by behavioral targeting companies.57 As such, injunctive
relief was needed in order to prevent Google and DoubleClick from
continuing to harm users through deceptive and unfair business
practices.58 EPIC thus concluded that the merger would create the
largest database of Internet activities, and the lack of any legal
obligation to privacy or security of the information required Google to
show a public plan for compliance with guidelines, such as those of
the OECD.59 These guidelines required Google to give reasonable
access to users whose data has been collected and maintained, to
create a reasonable data destruction policy, and to have DoubleClick
remove user identified cookies from their records before the merger
unless given affirmative consent to keep them, in order to comply with
the FTC and Antitrust Acts.60
EPIC filed two supplements to its complaint with additional facts
on the merger in question. 61 The New York State Consumer
Protection Board endorsed the original complaint, and expressed fear
that Google and DoubleClick could create "superprofiles" of personally
identifiable and non-identifiable information of web users,
culminating in the largest such databases ever known. 62 Google's use
57 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 11, at 10.
58 Id. at 9. EPIC stated that the acts were deceptive because a user was not informed of
Google's data collection processes until that user clicked through four links, and in doing
so, allowed Google to collect user search terms and IP addresses without notice to the user.
EPIC stated that the acts were unfair because they were performed without the knowledge
or consent of users and without complying with Fair Information Practices and OECD
Guidelines.
59 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
supra note 56.
60 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 11, at 10-11.
61 Supplemental Materials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction,
Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, supra note 46, at 1; see also Second Filing
of Supplemental Materials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction,
Request for Information and for Other Relief, In Re Google and DoubleClick, 1 (Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Sept. 17, 2007), http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/supp2_o91707.pdf.
62 Supplemental Materials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction,
Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, supra note 46, at 2. "Personally identifiable
information" is data that can be linked to specific individuals, including such examples as
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of the various programs and devices it places online for people to use
results in Google collecting data on persons that may be held for
lengthy, indeterminate periods of time.63 Among these programs and
devices are Orkut, a social networking website, and Google Calendar,
a scheduling tool that has its information maintained on Google's
servers. 64 While Google claims data collection is used for "quality
control" and "personalized user experiences," EPIC noted that Google
never explained the meaning of "quality control."65 Also, while Google
does not sell user information, EPIC stated that Google has been
known to share its information with other companies, and that
Google's refusal to sell user information is merely a voluntary act. 66
Despite the objections raised, on December 20, 2007, the FTC
released a statement approving the Google-DoubleClick merger by a
four to one vote.67 The merger was reviewed under the Clayton Act,
which prohibits a merger or acquisition that "may be substantially to
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly."68 In its opinion,
the FTC noted that the merger was potentially harmful to Internet
users because of the potential for the merged company to exploit its
new, combined data set, but the FTC stated that it lacked authority to
require conditions to the merger not relating to antitrust; the sole
purpose of antitrust review being "to identify and remedy transactions
that harm competition," and thus does not focus on harm to
consumers. 69 Additionally, the FTC also stated that regulating one
e-mail, phone numbers, and addresses. "Non-identifiable information" is information
based off of data on a consumer's computer sent by the cookie. FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS,
supra note 7, at 4.
63 Supplemental Materials is Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction,
Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, supra note 46, at 3. EPIC cited complaints
with several tools offered to the public by Google, among them Blogger, You Tube, and
Google Maps. Id. at 7-8.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC FILE No. 071-0170, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK 1 (2007) [HEREINAFTER FTC STATEMENT
CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK],
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o71o17o/o7122ostatement.pdf.
68 Id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2008).
69 FTC STATEMENT CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 67, at 2.
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company's privacy requirements "could itself pose a serious detriment
to competition in this vast and rapidly evolving industry."7o Thus, the
FTC focused on the competitive aspects of the merger, and finding
none that would violate the Clayton Act, approved the merger by a
four to one vote, with Commissioner Harbour dissenting.71 Unlike her
colleagues, Harbour argued that "if the Commission closes its
investigation at this time, without imposing any conditions on the
merger, neither the competition nor the privacy interests of
consumers will have been adequately addressed."72
VI. THE FTC STAFF'S PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR BEHAVIORAL
TARGETING
The Google-DoubleClick merger created considerable debate
among privacy groups, and groups such as the Center for Democracy
and Technology ("CDT") requested that the FTC hold a workshop to
deal with their privacy concerns over the merger and Google's
policies.73 Critics of the Microsoft-aQuantive and DoubleClick-Google
mergers view them as potential threats to privacy due to potential
consumer injuries that could occur, such as invasion of privacy by
holding sensitive information for lengthy periods of time, leaving
consumers potentially vulnerable to searches by law enforcement
officers from various countries with no legal authorization, and
encouraging other companies to engage in similar behavior that would
exacerbate the problem.74 On November 1st and 2nd of 2007, the FTC
hosted a workshop on online behavioral targeting. 75 Named
"eHavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology," the
workshop was intended to "bring together consumer advocates,
70 Id.
71 See In the Matter of Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-0170 (Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Dec. 20, 2007) (dissenting statement of Comm'r Pamela Jones Harbour),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o71o17o/o7122oharbour.pdf.
72 Id. at 1.
73 Supplemental Materials is Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction,
Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, supra note 46.
74 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 11, at 10.
75 Fed. Trade Comm'n., eHavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting and Technology,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ehavioral/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
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industry representatives, technology experts, and academics to
address consumer protection issues raised by behavioral targeting."76
Nine privacy organizations requested the FTC provide needed
consumer protections within the behavioral targeting sphere.77 The
FTC identified several key issues that would drive the agenda:
consumer knowledge, the necessity of disclosure to consumers, the
use and protection of the collected data, and standards that currently
protect this data, along with what standards should be used to protect
this data.78 In response to the FTC workshop, several industry groups,
consumer advocates, and individual companies created
recommendations involving the issues raised by behavioral targeting.
Among the recommendations were a "Do Not Track" proposal, reports
that discussed and critiqued the current practices in behavioral
targeting and self-regulatory initiatives, and a variety of industry
initiatives to address the privacy issues raised.79
After hosting the workshop and reviewing the comments it
generated, the FTC determined that there was a consensus on certain
core issues and concerns that had emerged from the discussions ° The
FTC staff drafted proposed principles from this consensus, which were
released for public comments and input on the core issues.8' The
issues involved the lack of knowledge consumers have regarding
76 Id.
77 Press Release, Ctr. for Democracy and Tech., Privacy & Consumer Groups Recommend
"Do Not Track List" and Other Policy Solutions to Offer Consumers More Control Over
Online Behavioral Tracking (Oct. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.cdt.org/press/2oo71o31press.php.
78 See ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 1, at 2.
79 Id. at 2. The requested "Do Not Track" list was intended to protect consumers in the
same way that the Do Not Call list does; allowing consumers to express a desire to keep
their information from being tracked, stored, and used without their permission or
knowledge. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., supra note 77. See also, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM,
THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE: FAILING AT CONSUMER PROTECTION AND AT SELF-
REGULATION (Nov. 2, 2007),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_NAIreportNov2-2007fs.pdf. The World
Privacy Forum pointed out four particular failings of the current NAI guidelines: lack of a
consistently working opt-out cookie, ignorance of new business practices and profiling
techniques, a lack of inclusion of a majority of behavioral targeting groups, and a lack of
transparency and independence.
8o ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 1, at 2.
81 Id.
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behavioral targeting; the values of transparency and consumer
autonomy, described by business and consumer groups as "critical to
the development and maintenance of consumer trust in the online
marketplace;" and concerns of data collected for behavioral targeting
falling into the wrong hands or being misused.82
From these core issues, the FTC then proposed some governing
principles for behavioral targeting on the day that the Google-
DoubleClick merger was approved, and sought comment by the
interested parties. 83 The first issue addressed was that of the
interested parties citing a need for greater transparency and consumer
control in behavioral targeting. 84 Interest groups criticized current
disclosures as being "difficult to understand, inaccessible, and overtly
technical and long."85 In addition, the FTC noted clearer disclosure
allows consumers to make informed decisions regarding whether they
desire personalized advertising. 86 However, the FrC noted that many
consumers do not even read privacy policies, raising a question of how
willing and able consumers are to understand long privacy
disclosures.87
The FTC stated that privacy policies are an important tool for both
providing information to consumers as well as promoting
accountability among businesses; at the same time, the FTC conceded,
businesses may have legitimate needs to change privacy policies. 88
The FTC concluded that companies must keep any promises made at
the time data is collected in regard to the handling or protection of
82 Id.
83 Id. at 3.
84Id.
85 Id. The FrC proposed that websites that collected data for behavioral targeting should
provide a "clear, concise, consumer-friendly, and prominent statement" that (i) the
consumer's online activity data was being collected for behavioral targeting purposes, and
(2) consumers can choose whether to have their information collected for such purpose.
Additionally, websites were to provide consumers with a "clear, easy-to-use, and accessible
method" to exercise whether or not the websites collected their information. Id. at 3.
86 Id.
87 Id. For more information on consumer habits regarding privacy policies, see Aleecia M.
McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 ISJLP 543
(2008) (within this same volume).
8 8 ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 1, at 5.
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consumer data, even if policies are later changed.8 9 Thus, before
companies can use data in a materially different manner than
originally suggested, the FTC proposed that affected consumers must
provide affirmative, express consent. 90 The second issue tackled was
that of the security of the collected data. Individuals and privacy
interest groups stated that appropriate security measures were needed
in order to ensure that data collected would not fall into the hands of
criminals. 91 Still, the FTC noted that some data collected would
probably not be traceable to individuals and would thus do little harm
even if wrongfully obtained.92
Third, there was a discussion of the duration of data retention.
While noting that users faced greater risks when collected data was
held for long periods of time, the FTC also noted that there could be
valid reasons for a company to hold onto such information for
extended periods of time, including improving customer service and
tracking criminal activities on the website.93
Additionally, the FTC noted that consumers might consider the
use of sensitive information collected for behavioral targeting to be an
invasive use of personal information.94 Lastly, the FTC discussed their
concern that the consumer-tracking data collected for behavioral
targeting purposes could be used for purposes that were potentially
harmful.95 The FTC did not propose a remedial principle in regard to
this issue, citing a need for additional information.96
89 id.
9°Id. at 5-6.
91 Id. at 4. The FTC proposed a "reasonable security" standard for data collected for
behavioral targeting, with protection of the data being based on "sensitivity of the data, the
nature of a company's business operations, the types of risks a company faces, and the
reasonable protections available to a company."
92 Id.
93 Id. The FTC proposal was that information should only be retained as long as necessary
to "fulfill a legitimate business or law enforcement need." Id. at 4.
94 Id. The FTC's proposed principle to remedy this issue was that companies should only
collect sensitive data for the purposes of behavioral targeting when the user from whom
they were collecting the data gave affirmative express consent. The FTC sought specific
input on what information should be sensitive and whether advertising companies should
ever use that sensitive information or whether it should be subject to consumer choice.
95 Id. at 6. This harm was considered especially high in cases where the collection of the
data was invisible to consumers, though it was also noted that there was a possibility that
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After listing their proposed principles, the FTC sought additional
commentary and discussion from the public at large and from those
affected by the provisions specifically.97 In addition, the FTC noted
that it did not intend to block additional discussion on other ideas that
addressed the issues raised by online behavioral targeting.98
VII. COMMENTS RECEIVED BY THE FTC AND THE NEW NAI
PRINCIPLES OF 2008
The FTC requested comments on their eHavioral conference, and
received sixty-three comments as of January 4, 2009.99 Among the
organizations that have commented are the NAI and the CDT. The
NAI noted in their comments that behavioral targeting in and of itself
is not harmful.100 Additionally, the NAI remarked that data used in
behavioral targeting is not inherently risky, because the data typically
collected is not of a sort that would place persons at risk for identity
theft. 101 The NAI also noted that behavioral targeting allows the
development and creation of stronger communities of previously
disparate, like-minded persons, wherein these persons can coordinate
secondary data usage could potentially provide benefits such as the secondary data being
used to develop or enhance new or existing products appealing to consumer bases.
96 Id. at 6. In particular, the FTC sought data on (1) the secondary uses of data that raise
concern, (2) whether companies were using this concerned data for secondary purposes,
(3) "whether the concerns about secondary uses are limited to the use of personally
identifiable data or also extend to non-personally identifiable data," and (4) if these
secondary uses occur, whether they merit a form of heightened protection.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Fed. Trade Comm'n, # 228; Project No. P859900: Online Behavioral Advertising:
Moving the Discussion Forward to Possible Self-Regulatory Principles,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladprinciples/index.shtm (last visited Feb. 2,
2009).
100 Letter from J. Trevor Hughes, Executive Director, Network Adver. Initiative, to Office of
the Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Apr. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladprinciples/o8o4lonai.pdf.
1o Id. at 5. Data with potential for abuse is data gathered that can personally identify
users. The NAI states that NAI group members do not collect personally identifiable
information, and the information collected is not subject to the inherent risks of identity
theft and other abuses that exist with personally identifiable information. Id. at 5-6.
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and convene.10 2 Still, consumers are concerned about the use of their
browsing history in the behavioral targeting context.10 3 The NAI
recommended that due to the broad and diverse nature of business
models in the online economy, the best solution to privacy concerns
would be self-regulation by the behavioral targeting companies
alongside codes of practice promulgated by organizations such as the
American Advertising Federation for advertisers and the Interactive
Advertising Bureau for websites.o4
Additionally, the NAI released updated principles of self-
regulation in December of 2008.105 The NAI required all members to
follow their new principles of transparency, notice, choice, use
limitations, transfer and service restrictions, access, reliable sources,
security, data retention, and following applicable laws, as set out by
the NA. 10 6 Such principles were stated as continuing the NAI's
102 Id. at 7.
103 Id. at 8.
104 Id. at lo. See also AAF-Online Privacy, http://www.aaf.org/default.asp?id=358 (last
visited Feb. 9, 2009). IAB- Privacy Policy, http://www.iab.net/privacy policy (last visited
Feb. 9, 2009).
105 NETwORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, 2008 NAI PRINCIPLES: THE NETWORKADVERTISING
INITIATIVE'S SELF-REGULATORY CODE OF CONDUCT 1 (2OO8),
http://networkadvertising.org/networks/2oo8%2oNAI%2oPrinciplesjfinal%2ofor%20W
ebsite.pdf. The NAI itself was introduced in 1999 after the DoubleClick-Abacus fiasco,
adopted its first set of principles in 2000, and updated these principles in 2008. Network
Adver. Initiative, The NAI Principles: How They Help Protect Your Privacy,
http://networkadvertising.org/managing/principles.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). Press
Release, Network Adver. Initiative, Network Advertising Initiative Announces 2008 NAI
Self-Regulatory Code of Conduct for Online Behavioral Advertising (Dec. 16, 2008),
available at
http://networkadvertising.org/networks/2oo8_NAIPrinciples-PR-FINAL.pdf.
106 NETwoRK ADVER. INITIATIVE, supra note 105, at 4-11. The principles are as follows: (1)
Transparency by maintenance of a NAI website, as well as reasonable efforts to inform
consumers; (2) notice by clear and conspicuous postings of clear descriptions of several
pieces of information having to do with data collection; (3) choice of opt-out options for
collection of identification, with mergers of personally identifiable ("PI") and non-
personally identifiable information ("non-PII") and collection of sensitive data requiring
consumers to opt-in; (4) limiting of use of data to marketing purposes, and of collection of
data for companies to those with which there is a contractual relationship; (5) contractual
requirements with third parties requiring adherence to the NAI principles for PII and non-
PII that will be merged with non-PII; (6) reasonable access to consumers to collected data;
(7) members making reasonable efforts to assure they obtain their data from reliable
sources; (8) reasonable security measures determined by factors such as data sensitivity
and risks faced by companies; (9) data only being retained for legitimate business needs;
and (1o) members following applicable law. Id. at 7-10.
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commitment to fair information practices and business models, while
still maintaining self-regulation.1°7
Encouraged by the FTC's self-regulation principles, the CDT sent
in comments of their own.,o8 The CDT declared that the NAI's self-
regulatory principles were inadequate in regard to protecting
individual consumers. 109 It felt consumer choice benefits far
outweighed the costs of following stricter guidelines, and therefore,
asked for more specific guidelines than those suggested by the FTC,
fearing that the FTC's vague guidelines would be less likely to have a
significant impact on protecting consumer privacy.11° While pleased
with most of the FTC's proposed principals, the CDT remained
concerned that consumer control and transparency were not treated
as the same issue, and that the creation of standards in disclosures of
behavioral targeting companies would raise consumer awareness of
targeting the associated privacy concerns.,,, The CDT also suggested
that the FTC promote further transparency through web browsers and
create explicit consumer control options.112 Consumer opt-out was
noted as an option that should be honored until the consumer
voluntarily opts back in.113
IX. THE FTC's SELF REGULATORY PRINCIPLES
On February 12, 2009, the FTC released its much-anticipated
behavioral targeting principles, opting for a self-regulatory
approach. 114 The principles redefine behavioral targeting as the
107 Id. at 3.
io8 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ET AL., IN REGARDS TO THE FTC STAFF STATEMENT:
"ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-
REGULATORY PRINCIPLES," (Apr. 11, 20o8),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladprinciples/o8o4llcdtetal.pdf.
1o9 Id. at 5-6.
11o Id. at 6.
- Id. at 19.
112 Id. at 18.
113 Id. at 21.
114 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Staff Revises Online Behavioral Targeting
Principles (Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo9/o2/behavad.shtm.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE
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tracking of consumer online activities over time to deliver advertising
services that are targeted to consumer interests. 1" 5 The FTC's report
primarily addresses transparency and consumer control, stating that
websites should provide clear and concise statements regarding data
collection for behavioral profiling, and that consumers should be able
to choose whether they desire to have their information collected for
such a purpose.11 6 The report also suggests that alternative disclosure
and opt-out methods should be developed for data collection "outside
the traditional website context," whatever that would include1'7
The FTC then dealt with the security of the collected data. First,
FTC staff suggested that the data collected should be reasonable when
viewed in regard to the data's sensitivity, the gathering company's
business operations, the particular risks the gathering company may
face, and the protections considered reasonably available to the
company.,,8 Companies were also told they should only retain data as
long as necessary to fulfill legitimate business needs.119
The FrC further stated that companies must honor any prior
affirmative promises made regarding their handling and retention of
behavioral targeting data.120 This holds true even if the company later
changes its data-retention policies.121 Were a company to attempt to
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 1 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo9/o2/Po854oobehavadreport.pdf. Concurring statements as
to the regulatory principles were made by Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour
(Concurring Statement of Comm'r Paula Jones Harbour, Regarding Staff Report, "Self-
Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Targeting" (Feb. 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo9/o2/Po854oobehavadharbour.pdf) and Commissioner Jon
Leibowitz (Concurring Statement of Comm'r Jon Leibowitz, FTC Staff Report: Self-
Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Targeting (Feb. 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo9/o2/Po854oobehavadleibowitz.pdf).
115 FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING, supra note 114, at 46. This definition expressly excluded "first party
advertising," where no data is shared with third parties. The definition also expressly
excluded "contextual advertising," where ads are based upon single visits to a web page or a
single search query. Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 46-47.
119 Id. at 47.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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use the data in a different manner than originally stated, the FTC
would require consumers to give their express affirmative consent to
the policy changes. 122 According to the FIC's report, companies may
only collect sensitive data for behavioral targeting after receiving
express affirmative consent from the user.123 The FTC noted that its
principles are based on a self-regulatory model, and therefore, do not
create an affirmative obligation on behavioral targeting companies to
abide by the principles.124
X. CONCLUSION
Behavioral targeting provides a helpful method of creating
personally directed advertisements from the information collected
from Internet users, and allows better advertising of niche markets,
allowing them to expand and diversify. However, the data behavioral
advertising companies collect raises privacy concerns, and mergers
between large corporations that house significant amounts of
behavioral targeting information heighten concerns over the security
and privacy measures placed over such information. While opt-out
cookies and self-policing have been the main approach to assure that
users' information is given the proper level of security, concerns still
exist that this is not enough.
The FTC's newly released self-regulatory principles were revised to
deal with the most pressing concerns of privacy advocate groups.
However, having only recently been created, it remains unclear
whether these principles will be effective or whether Congress will
have to step in to provide more rigorous regulations.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 45-46.
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